Time scales of representation in the human brain: weighing past information to predict future events by Lee Harrison
HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE
Recent extensions to these ideas propose that the specific time 
scale which engages a cortical area can be inferred by its location 
from primary sensory (short time scale, STS) to high level areas 
(long time scale, LTS; Kiebel et al., 2008). This extends previous 
accounts by regarding cortex as a single hierarchy (which includes 
early sensory responses), rather than partitioning this hierarchy 
into motor and perceptual subdivisions, or indeed focusing on 
prefrontal regions alone. This view makes the prediction that the 
brain’s estimation of uncertainty depends on how information 
is used about past events, and that progressively more extended 
time scales will map onto progressively higher regions of the 
cortical hierarchy.
The aim of the current paper is to directly address this hypoth-
esis, and test whether neuronal responses are characterized by 
specific time scales, with progressively longer time scales being 
represented in more anterior parts of cortex. In particular, this 
hypothesis predicts that responses in regions involved in execu-
tive control, i.e., frontal cortex, will be engaged at behavioral time 
scales that integrate past information. In addition, it is predicted 
that regions lower down the hierarchy, e.g., primary visual cortex, 
will respond at the time scale corresponding to individual events.
The first steps toward formulating a quantitative map from 
uncertainty onto behavioral responses were taken by Hick (1952) 
and Hyman (1953), who demonstrated a linear dependence of 
reaction time (RT) on the number of options in a forced-choice 
task. Because options appeared randomly and event  probability 
IntroductIon
Causal structure within the physical world induces regularities in 
the order and timing of events. Whether there is uncertainty in the 
underlying physical process or not, an observer of these events will 
always be uncertain, to a degree, about these underlying generative 
processes as they have to be inferred from a finite (often small) 
number of observations. Importantly, such regularities may be gen-
erated by a combination of processes at different temporal scales. For 
example, while a visual stimulus may only occur for a brief moment, 
it can also be embedded in a sequence of events and thereby convey 
information that will update one’s expectations. At the same time, 
slowly changing contextual causes shape the rapid fluctuation of a 
visual scene with time. Encoding this uncertainty is important to an 
observer because it provides a basis to efficiently allocate resources 
to make predictions that protect against overconfidence.
Previous accounts have suggested that the brain is organized 
hierarchically, according to the temporal structure and regularities 
in which events occur. Accordingly, prefrontal cortex is hierarchi-
cally organized along a rostro-caudal gradient, in which temporally 
more complex and extended representations are progressively pre-
sented more rostrally (Koechlin et al., 2003; Badre, 2008). These 
more rostral regions thus encode information over longer time 
intervals (Fuster, 2001, 2004) and more complex temporal rela-
tionships (Koechlin and Hyafil, 2007). Temporal scale is therefore 
thought to be the critical parameter that distinguishes the hierarchi-
cal organization of the prefrontal lobe (Botvinick, 2008).
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decreases with the number of options this suggests that a  statistical 
model could be used to form hypotheses as to how humans encode 
uncertainty to make informed decisions. One way to achieve this is 
to use information theoretic (IT) indices (such as the average uncer-
tainty or entropy), which are a function of the observers estimate 
of the probability distribution responsible for generating samples 
(Strange et al., 2005; Harrison et al., 2006; Bestmann et al., 2008; 
Mars et al., 2008; see Materials and Methods for detail).
Previously we have shown with this approach that an ideal 
observer using all past events can be used to explain the role of the 
hippocampus in encoding uncertainty (Strange et al., 2005; Harrison 
et al., 2006), changes in cortical excitability during action prepa-
ration under varying conditions of uncertainty (Bestmann et al., 
2008), cortical potentials (P300) linked to contextual updating (Mars 
et al., 2008), and saccadic eye movements (Brodersen et al., 2008). An 
important feature of the computational model used in our previous 
studies, however, is its inability to forget. Estimation of uncertainties 
was based on all previous events. Here, we relax this assumption, and 
generalize this to a time-dependent model, where distant events are 
weighted less than recent ones. We first illustrate how such models 
can be used to explain human responses using simulated RT and 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data, which in turn 
provide face validity for the Bayesian framework used here to evalu-
ate the relative evidence for competing models. We used computa-
tional fMRI1 (Friston and Dolan, 2010) in combination with Bayesian 
model selection (BMS; Rosa et al., 2010) to investigate the functional 
organization of time scales that support the encoding and response 
in humans to uncertainty among visual events guiding action. To 
test our hypothesis, we used RT and fMRI data previously reported 
in Harrison et al. (2006).
MaterIals and Methods
ProbabIlIty Model and transItIon ProbabIlItIes
We here considered k = 1 … K visual colored shapes, where K 
equals 2 and 4 in our simulations and experiment (see later for 
further details on the specific task) respectively that an observer 
has to respond to as fast as possible, but always has some degree 
of uncertainty about which shape will occur. At time point t
i
 we 
observe the symbol x
i
. For example, x
i
 = 2 corresponds to the second 
colored shape. The number of “counts” of the k-th event type, α
k
, 
is updated according to the following formula
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where t
i
 is the time of the i-th observation and δ(x
i
 = k) equals 1 if 
the i-th observation was of the k-th symbol. The count variables for 
time point t
N
 are therefore based on all previous observations, but 
they are exponentially weighted depending on recency. The infinite 
time scale (ITS) model used in previous work (Harrison et al., 
2006) corresponds to the assumption that τ = ∞ (in this case the 
exponential terms reduce to unity). In other words, the model never 
forgets. The counts are all initialized to 1 at the first time point.
The posterior probability of the k-th event occurring is given by 
the k-th parameter of a Multinomial distribution (Bishop, 2006)
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The information content or “surprise” of the N-th trial is given 
by
l N Nk( ) = − log ( )ρ
Thus the occurrence of a low probability event is more surpris-
ing. The entropy (average information content) is given by
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In the simple approach described above, with τ = ∞, the total 
number of effective counts increases by one with each sample. 
The consequence of this is that, in effect, the model never forgets. 
This is an important observation because it means that it cannot 
be used to investigate the effect of time or forgetting on response. 
Given this, the next natural step is to finesse the model to explore 
differences due to the number and weight given to past samples. 
The introduction of a decay function is the way to do this, which 
adds a further dimension to the model and enables one to test the 
number of samples a subject uses when responding to uncertainty. 
We achieve this by damping the effective counts as illustrated in 
Figure 1. This shows a schematic based on a sequence of events 
sampled from a Bernoulli process, e.g., a series of coin tosses, 
where the probability of “Heads” is fixed throughout the sam-
ple. Note there are only two outcomes in this simple example, 
i.e., K = 2, however, four are used in the experimental task (see 
“Acquisition, Preprocessing, and Analysis of fMRI Data”). The 
main point here is that the extent of integration has an impact 
on features of explanatory variables that are used to explain RT 
and fMRI data. As such we can use this model to measure the 
effects of integration over past events on behavioral and neuronal 
responses.
The experiment described in Harrison et al. (2006) generated 
symbols which additionally had probabilistic dependencies between 
trials, such that the current sample depended on the previous, a 
so-called first-order Markov process. That is, there is further order 
to the random sequence beyond that in each trial. In other words, 
the dependence between consecutive random variables imposes 
additional order on the set of trials in a block. It is this structure 
that, if estimated, can be used to reduce uncertainty in the set of 
samples, which will have an impact on a subject’s response.
The first-order Markov dependencies, or transition probabili-
ties, can be estimated in a similar way as the event probabilities 
above. That is, one has a K-by-K table of “transition counts” 
where the i,j-th entry counts the number of times symbol i was 
preceded by symbol j. One then also employs an exponential 
weighting as above. One can then compute a transition prob-
ability matrix for each time point and from this one can derive 
an estimate of the mutual information, as previously described 
(Harrison et al., 2006).
1This is a term given to “…a new sort of data modeling philosophy … [where] … 
researchers have begun to explain their data in terms of quantities the brain must 
encode, under simplifying assumptions about how the brain works.” Friston and 
Dolan (2010) 
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that is represented mathematically by a probability density (see 
Figure 3A). The process of generating data then amounts to sam-
pling from this density, i.e., given samples from u, β, and λ, we 
can generate the sample y. This generative model is based on a 
GLM, where the design matrix is comprised of IT indices. These 
depend on the input, u, and critically the half-life, τ, that charac-
terizes the number of past inputs used to compute them. When 
it comes to estimation, the objective is to quantify a probability 
distribution over the half-life, i.e., quantify evidence for values of 
this parameter that explain the response, y. The model presented 
here can be extended to model group data by including a third level 
as described in Bestmann et al. (2008) for group RT data, or used 
within a spatiotemporal model of fMRI data (Penny et al., 2005) 
as in Rosa et al. (2010).
acquIsItIon, PreProcessIng, and analysIs of fMrI data
Reaction time and fMRI data were collected whilst 13 participants 
performed a four-alternative forced-choice task (Harrison et al., 
2006). Four colored shapes were mapped onto four correspond-
ing finger movements. On each trial, participants responded as 
quickly and accurately as possible to the appearance of one of these 
visual stimuli, and performed 12 blocks of 40 trials each. At the 
beginning of a block, participants were cued for 5 s with the four 
visual shapes in a row at the bottom of the screen, which remained 
there throughout the block. On each trial, one of the four possible 
shapes was presented for 500 ms (2.2 s stimulus onset asynchrony). 
The colored shapes in each block were sampled from a discrete 
conditional probability distribution, with first-order dependence.
The probabilities used to generate sequences remained constant 
within a block and varied over blocks, thereby changing the predict-
ability of sequences of events. No indication as to an underlying 
pattern within the sequence was provided to the subject. RTs and 
fMRI data were recorded from subjects as they engaged with the 
experimental paradigm. Further details are provided in Harrison 
et al. (2006).
Participants were scanned whilst performing the task. For each 
participant, 552 gradient-echo echo-planar T2*-weighted MRI 
image volumes with blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) 
contrast were acquired on a 2T Siemens Vision system (TR 2506 ms, 
thirty-three 3.3 mm axial slices, 3 mm × 3 mm in-plane resolution). 
Thirteen subjects were scanned and one participant was excluded 
due to corruption of data on retrieval from storage. Data were pre-
processed [realignment, normalization to the anatomical Montreal 
Neurological Institute (MNI) standard space] using SPM8 (www.
fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk) and non-smoothed data entered into a spatiotem-
poral fMRI model (Penny et al., 2005) using an unweighted graph 
Laplacian and graph-partitioning of brain volume into subvolumes 
(Harrison et al., 2008).
Model coMParIson of fMrI data
We compared three models; “onsets only,” short and long time 
scales . The “null” model of this analysis comprised onsets of visual 
stimuli, nuisance variables (missed trials) and a column for the 
session mean. The remaining two models used IT indices based on 
different decay half-lives. The optimal (i.e., most probable) half-life 
estimated from the behavioral RT data was four past samples (see 
Figure 3C), which we took to be the LTS for the fMRI analysis. This 
sIMulated data
Reaction times were simulated for 12 subjects, each containing 
12 blocks (each comprised of 40 samples), as in the experimental 
paradigm, using a known half-life of four past events. The aim of 
this simulation was to recover the known half-life using Bayesian 
model comparison. This was achieved using the group analysis 
described in Bestmann et al. (2008) to compute the probability 
of the data, the so-called model evidence, for a range of half-lives 
(from one to eight past events in steps of a half). The input, u, was 
sampled from a Bernoulli process, i.e., K = 2, and used to construct 
a design matrix, X, used to generate a response. For simplicity, we 
here focused on a model that comprised three columns (entropy, 
surprise, and offset). We now described how data were generated 
for a single block. This was based on the following generative model
y X u e
e
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Samples from a random process are represented by u, response 
data is in the vector, y, of length T, the design matrix, X(u, τ), con-
tains IT indices (e.g., entropy and surprise in response to u) along 
with a column of ones and I
N
 is the identity matrix of dimension 
N. General linear model (GLM) coefficient weights are β and error 
precisions are λ = {λ
1
, λ
2
}.
In simple terms we can think of events in the external world, 
denoted by u, acting as inputs that drive measurable responses in 
humans, y. This amounts to a set of dependent random  variables 
FIguRe 1 | Information theoretic indices. A sample from a Bernoulli 
process, e.g., a sequence of coin tosses, over 40 events (top panel), 
schematic showing differences in the estimated probability of Heads, given 
past samples (middle panel) and a typical IT measure, i.e., “surprise,” used in a 
computational model to quantify subject responses (lower panel). Short (STS) 
or long time scale (LTS), i.e., integration over few or many past events, are 
shown by the blue and red traces, respectively. The differences between the 
two processes are best appreciated by considering the 28th event (indicated 
by the vertical dotted line). The estimated probability of Heads is low for the 
STS as it is the first Head in five events. By contrast, many samples have 
occurred over a longer period, which is reflected in the estimate using the LTS. 
STS is therefore sensitive to local changes (over events) in the process, 
whereas the LTS averages these out. This is seen again when considering a 
function of the estimated probability of Heads, e.g., the negative log of this 
estimate, i.e., the surprise. For the STS the probability of Heads is low and 
therefore the surprise is high compared to the LTS that estimates the coin to 
be approximately fair.
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We furthermore sought to recover a known spatial pattern of 
half-lives using BMS maps (Rosa et al., 2010). A square of 32 voxels 
was partitioned into three regions (or labels), corresponding to 
three different causes of data sampled from within them: IT indices 
using a half-life of τ = 1, and τ = 4 and “mean only,” given the same 
samples from the Bernoulli process above. The true spatial pattern 
of labels is shown in the upper row of Figure 2D and time series 
data were generated in each pixel according to which of the three 
models it belonged.
The evidence for each model is shown in the middle row of 
Figure 2D, which is thresholded to give a binary map below. We 
get an impression of how good the method is at measuring the 
spatial distribution of labels by comparing the upper and lower 
rows, i.e., true and estimated spatial pattern of labels. As shown 
in Figure 2D, there is a high correspondence between these maps, 
suggesting that our approach can recover the true spatial pattern 
of labels.
We note that it is a current standard of practice to smooth log-
evidence maps for each model to increase signal to noise. A conse-
quence of this is that the extent of the “mean only” model reduces 
as the width of smoothing kernel increases. This is important as it 
motivates not to include the “mean only” model when analyzing 
fMRI data, and use a more realistic “null” model comprised of trial 
onsets and mean.
reactIon tIMes and fMrI data
A sample of RTs from one subject over one block of the forced-
choice task, including model fit (for the most probable model), 
and distribution of model evidence over time scales are shown 
in Figures 3B,C. These are noisy data compared to simulations, 
which is reflected in the broader distribution of model evidence. 
However, there is clear evidence for an optimal half-life of four 
past events. This is important because it concurs with our predic-
tion that there should be evidence for an optimal behavioral time 
scale of response. This is made all the more striking given the noise 
inherent in RT data.
For the fMRI data, we used the resulting log-evidence maps to 
quantify the relative evidence for each model, at each voxel. This 
latter map is an example of a posterior probability map (PPM), 
which is used in a similar way to statistical parametric maps 
(SPMs), i.e., to interrogate data. Exceedance probability maps 
(EPM; STS model along the top) for our computational fMRI 
analysis are shown in Figure 3D (displayed for illustrative purposes 
at thresholds of 0.9 and 0.6 for the STS and LTS models, respec-
tively). These are maps showing which model best explains data 
at each voxel. Figure 3E shows the location of both STS and LTS 
responses in the frontal cortex, which demonstrates its partitioning 
into short and LTS regions in line with proposals of a hierarchical 
organization in this region (Badre, 2008; Kiebel et al., 2008). The 
expected and exceedance probability at the voxel marked by the 
cross-hairs (see caption for coordinates) are shown in Figure 3F. 
This latter quantity is the probability that the k-th model is better 
than the others.
The “onsets” model did not explain any voxels above a 0.5 
threshold. Greatest evidence for the STS model was measured 
in primary and secondary visual, parietal, and frontal cortices, 
while that for the LTS model was focused on the frontal cortices. 
way, time scales observed in behavioral responses inform on those 
to look for in fMRI data measured from the same experimental task. 
A short half-life relative to this was chosen to be one past sample. 
These models contained the same three columns as for the first 
model (onsets only), plus IT indices as first-order parametric mod-
ulators. For all models, the onsets were convolved with a canonical 
hemodynamic response function (HRF). We used the same four 
IT indices used in Harrison et al. (2006), i.e., entropy, surprise, 
mutual information, trial-by-trial reduction in surprise. The latter 
two additional measures are due to dependence between consecu-
tive samples. These were added because the random sequence pre-
sented to subjects was sampled from a first-order Markov process. 
That is, the current event depended to a degree on the previous. 
This means there is information as to what the next event will be, 
given the current, which amounts to a reduction in surprise if the 
previous sample is known. The average of this reduction in surprise 
is called the mutual information.
To ask about the spatial deployment of time scales in the brain, 
we used a Bayesian spatial model and BMS maps. This was instead of 
the classical approach to fMRI where data are smoothed and models 
compared using F-contrasts, because competing models can be con-
veniently compared, at each voxel, by measuring the model evidence 
(Penny et al., 2007). This is based on similar ideas to that underlying 
F-contrasts, however is more general because it is not limited to 
comparing just two models, which are not restricted to be linear.
We used a so-called Gaussian–Markov random field (GMRF) 
spatial prior over GLM coefficients (Penny et al., 2005) to com-
pute log-evidence maps for each model and subject. These were 
smoothed with a 12-mm FWHM Gaussian kernel. The evidence 
for each model was estimated using the approach described in 
Rosa et al. (2010). In particular, we used the so-called random 
effects (RFX) approach that accounts for inter-subject variability, 
by allowing the optimal model to be different for each subject. 
This approach is robust to outliers (Stephan et al., 2009; Rosa et al., 
2010) and enables comparison of more than two models, including 
non-linear as well as linear models.
results
sIMulatIons: reactIon tIMe and fMrI data
We used synthetic RT and fMRI data to provide face validity of the 
above method in measuring evidence for different models. The 
aim of this simulation was to demonstrate that time scales can be 
successfully recovered from RT and fMRI data, using synthetic data 
generated from a time-dependent multinomial-Dirichlet (MD) 
model (see Bishop, 2006). By this we mean that the data were gen-
erated in a two-stage process. First, a series of events, i.e., a sequence 
of 40 events in a block, were generated using an multinomial model 
with known parameters α. A finite time scale model, with scale = τ 
and initial values of unity was then used to generate the entropy and 
surprise to each event in the sequence (see equations in “Probability 
Model and Transition Probabilities”).
A sample of synthetic RTs and model fit (for the optimal model) 
over one block for one subject is shown in Figure 2A. Figure 2B 
shows the estimated probability of τ from which we read the most 
probable value to be four past events (the decay function for which 
is shown in Figure 2C). Critically, the results concur with the known 
true value from which the data were generated.
Harrison et al. Cortical memory maps
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primary sensory and association areas (Kiebel et al., 2008, 2009), 
and here we provide evidence from functional neuroimaging data 
that supports this idea.
We have applied this to RT and fMRI data using a Bayesian 
framework to quantify evidence for the half-life underlying these 
responses. The optimal half-life observed in behavioral data meas-
ured during the experimental task was four past observations. 
Therefore, no matter how many samples are presented, observers 
have a threshold on the effective number of past observations that 
guide their behavior. This provides evidence that observers dis-
count distant information when making inference about statistical 
regularities in their environment. This, however, is in the context of 
the current experimental task as one can imagine salient events of 
a general task that could have an impact on behavior that extend 
further into the past. The optimal behavioral half-life was then 
used to inform a group analysis of fMRI data to investigate the 
This is striking in that it is in line with the intuitive arguments 
and predictions made by Kiebel et al. (2008), and supports the 
notion of a gradient in the scale of time from back to frontal 
brain regions.
dIscussIon
The aim of this study was to explore the effect past observations 
have on human brain responses to uncertainty conveyed by events. 
It is based on generalizing the computational model used in previ-
ous studies (Strange et al., 2005; Harrison et al., 2006; Bestmann 
et al., 2008; Mars et al., 2008) to depend on a decay function, which 
we have chosen to be an exponential characterized by its half-life, 
over past observations. This idea appeals to intuition, in that dis-
carding information from the past is a common human experience. 
Current neuroscientific theories suggest a temporal gradient within 
the prefrontal cortex (Badre, 2008) and possibly beyond to include 
FIguRe 2 | Simulations. (A) A sample of simulated RT data from a single 
subject over one block is shown, along with the model fit (for the most probable 
half-life, see next figure). (B) The object of estimation is to quantify evidence for 
a range of half-life values. The model evidence, given RT data, shows an 
optimum for τ = 4, which concurs with the true value, i.e., that used to generate 
these data. (C) The most probable decay function over past events is shown, 
whose value is characteristically halved with every four events into the past. 
(D) Simulation of spatial data. A square region is partitioned into three areas 
(labels), corresponding to three different generative models. Data are generated 
at each pixel depending on the sampled input, u (see Figure 3A), and label 
assigned to it. The objective is to recover the true pattern of labels, given only 
these data, i.e., without direct knowledge of the true labels. The true pattern of 
labels is along the top row, while the estimated probability of belonging to a label 
is shown below, which is thresholded to give a binary map along the lower row.
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complex temporal relationships are represented in more anterior 
prefrontal regions (Hyafil et al., 2009) and that the temporal scale 
is the critical parameter that distinguishes the hierarchical organi-
zation of the prefrontal lobe (Botvinick, 2008). Consequently, as 
behavior is governed by temporal regularities, the organization of 
prefrontal cortex can be explained by the increasing ability to guide 
behavior based on increasing levels of temporal abstraction. The 
concordance between prediction and observations found in the 
present paper provides support for these proposals. More gener-
ally, it supports the use of ideas from probability and information 
theory to investigate the functional architecture of representing 
uncertainty in the human brain.
Whilst in this paper we have focussed on computing IT indices 
of sensory events, the same indices can be used to compute, e.g., 
the amount of information required to decide upon an action 
multiple neuronal scales that sub-serve it. Given this, we chose to 
explore two temporal scales, with half-lives of one (STS) and four 
samples (LTS). While the former appeals to intuition in represent-
ing the sensory input of events, the latter was found to be optimal 
for explaining our behavioral responses to the events. In addition, 
we predicted that IT indices at these two scales would find greatest 
evidence in primary visual and frontal regions (involved in con-
trolling executive function) respectively, based on the predictions 
made by Kiebel et al. (2008). We observed these predictions in fMRI 
data from 12 subjects along with strong evidence for STS model 
in the frontal cortex. This latter response is of particular interest 
because it aligns with the suggestion regarding multiple temporal 
scales being represented in frontal cortex (Badre, 2008), and that 
more rostral regions of prefrontal cortex encode more distal time 
intervals (Fuster, 2004). Other proposals have argued that more 
FIguRe 3 | Reaction time (RT), functional fMRI data, and model evidence. 
(A) Generative model of the process leading to a measured response, e.g., RT 
or fMRI data. Each node defines a random variable and arrows connecting 
nodes signify dependence. A sample from a random process, u, is used to 
construct IT indices, given a known half-life, and included in a design matrix used 
to generate data from a GLM. (B) RT data from a single subject over one 
experimental block along with model fit (for the optimal half-life). (C) Model 
evidence for the decay half-life for RT data. The greatest support, given the data, 
was found for τ = 4. (D) Exceedance probability maps (EPM) of fMRI data reveal 
regions where the greatest evidence for each of the two IT models (model 2: 
τ = 1; model 3: τ = 4) was observed (short time scale, STS model along the top). 
In line with theoretical accounts, evidence for short time scales was 
predominantly in primary and secondary visual cortex (cross hairs centrered on 
coordinate [0, −79, 4] MNI space) and superior parietal cortex. In addition, we 
found evidence for this in anterior prefrontal cortex (coordinates, [0, 50, 7]), 
whereas the largest evidence for long time scales was found in orbitofrontal 
cortex (coordinates, [6, 38, −14]). Both regions are color coded and shown in 
greater detail in (e). (e) Overlay of EPMs for both STS and LTS, illustrating the 
partitioning of prefrontal cortex according to progressively longer time scales. (F) 
A histogram of the EPM from the voxel containing the maximal value from both 
regions in (e) are shown on the far right, along with the expected probability to 
its left.
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prior and posterior densities (Itti and Baldi, 2009; Baldi and Itti, 
2010). Here, we have studied the integration of previous events 
using a kernel that exponentially weighted previous events. We 
note that it is also possible to examine the time scale of future 
events. This can be instantiated from a modeling perspective 
using a Gaussian kernel that extends over past and future samples, 
instead of just past events (Lebanon et al., 2007; Mao et al., 2007). 
This non-causal model may in the future prove a useful tool to 
measure the multiscale dynamics subserving auditory recogni-
tion and our use of natural language. One might also consider 
the use of asymmetric kernels to fractionate integrative versus 
predictive processing.
In this paper we compared models using a Bayesian instead 
of a classical method, i.e., BMS maps instead of F-contrasts. The 
two are related, but the Bayesian approach is much more general 
in that one can compare more than two models simultaneously 
and the models are not restricted to being nested (i.e., one being 
a special case of another; Rosa et al., 2010). This was useful here 
because we compared three models; “onsets only,” LTS, and STS 
models. We envisage that this BMS approach will be of great 
use more generally in computational fMRI (Corrado and Doya, 
2007; O’Doherty et al., 2007; Mars et al., 2010) and that this 
will allow brain imaging data to directly distinguish between the 
representations underlying computational models in for exam-
ple, value updating (Wunderlich et al., 2009), reinforcement 
learning (Glascher et al., 2010), and perceptual decision making 
(Forstmann et al., 2010).
conclusIon
We used computational fMRI along with BMS to show how dif-
ferent temporal scales are represented in the human brain. We 
relax the assumption of an ideal Bayesian observer, by making 
the integration of past observations dependent on a decay func-
tion over past events. Our analysis suggests that forgetfulness, at 
the level of cortical responses, is possibly a natural consequence 
reflecting temporal scales within our environment that impact 
on human behavior.
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(Koechlin et al., 2003). Indeed, because our paradigm employs a 
one to one deterministic mapping from sensory event to action 
(i.e., specific visual symbols were mapped onto specific actions) 
the information required for an action is entirely contained within 
the stimulus. This corresponds to a situation in which actions are 
entirely under “sensory control” (Koechlin and Summerfield, 2007) 
and the action entropy is equal to the sensory entropy. Thus our 
conclusions about time scales are also relevant to actions.
In order to address the central question of our study, namely 
the representation of temporal scales in the human brain, we have 
used an experimental paradigm that is designed to be analyzed 
using a computational model of brain function. That is, given the 
assumption that an observer represents uncertainty in data much 
like a Bayesian statistician, i.e., by estimating probabilities of a causal 
model that could have generated data, we have chosen a paradigm 
that depends on a well defined random process, i.e., a Markov proc-
ess. As such, standard statistical methods to represent this uncer-
tainty (e.g., Bayesian inference with Multinomial likelihoods and 
Dirichlet priors) can be used. Predicted responses of an observer are 
then functions of this causal model, of which IT indices are natural 
candidates. This is because these quantities have meaning in terms 
of the information contained in data that impacts on an observer, 
which we know from early experiments goes some way to mapping 
uncertainty onto behavioral responses (Hick, 1952; Hyman, 1953). 
These ideas have motivated more recent work using a MD compu-
tational model and IT indices to interpret behavioral and neuronal 
data (Harrison et al., 2006; Bestmann et al., 2008; Brodersen et al., 
2008; Mars et al., 2008). While these studies represent an advance, 
the computational model on which they are based is incapable of 
investigating the effect of time scales, which is needed to explore the 
hypothesis that the brain represents causes in the world at multiple 
temporal scales, as we have done here. We note that the discount-
ing of past observations may vary considerably with the structure 
and affordances of a task. Future work may address the boundaries 
over which information is optimally integrated, and whether such 
boundaries can be shaped by the current context. For example, the 
complexity of the structure underlying sensory events, or the pre-
dictability of the time of occurrence of events may additionally 
interact with how observers weight past observations.
In terms of the relation of the computational model described 
here and in other work, an alternative predictor of response to 
IT indices is to sequentially update the relative entropy between 
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